11 'Modernity,' Postmodemism, and the Law of Value

Capitalism, Modernity, and Value

There have been many accounts of what is distinctive and 'new' in modernity relative to what came before it. But the accounts that have exercised the greatest influence on social theory have been: (1) the theory of 'industrial society,' originating in the thought of Saint-Simon and developed in diverse ways by Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Ralf Dahrendorf, Raymond Aron, anda host of other theorists usually associated with the 'positivist' tradition of sociological theory; (2) the theory of capitalism associated with Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Werner Sombart, and Ferdinand Toennies, which emphasizes the *culturalist* discontinuities between precapitalist and capitalist social forms; and (3) the theory of capitalist society informed by Marx's theory of the generalization of the commodity form and the rise of the Jaw of labour-value as the dominant principle of socio-economic organization. Each of these theoretical accounts - or, more precisely, *theoretical strategie-s* recognizesa historical divide between pre-modem (traditional) and modem forms of social life. But, broadly speaking, the three strategies differ as to what should be highlighted in the epochal transition from the pre-modem to the modem. Theorists of industrial society emphasize the new relation to nature that humanity achieved with the momentous progress of science, technology, industry, division oflabour, and so forth. The culturalist theorists of capitalist society emphasize the changed 'mental universe' brought about by modernization: the rationalization and disenchantment of the modem world (Weber), the new forms of sociation sponsored by money relations (Simmel), and the changed value orientations resulting from the displacement of community by market-mediated association (Toennies). Finally, Marxists emphasize the ascendance of new and historically unique social relations of

production, which serve not only to promote a new human relation to nature (industrialism, centralization of production, and so on) but to sponsor in human beings a mode of thinking that gives a systematic impetus to the development of science and technology.

It may be somewhat schematic to do so, but there is heuristic value in pointing out that the theory of industrial society gives pride of place to Marx's 'material forces of production,' while the culturalist theory of capitalism tends to focus on Marx's 'ideal superstructure' (as well as those cultural products that fall outside a determinate social structure entirely). The *superiority* of Marx's theory of capitalism in relation to its two main competitors is precisely that it focuses on the social relations of production and reproduction that *mediate* the relationship between these two 'levels' - a relationship that remains tellingly indeterminate in all versions of non-Marxist social theory. The key to Marx's success in this respect consists precisely in his elaboration of a critique of the *naturalistic* conception of economic value - a conception that classical political economy shares with marginalism and that the theory of industrial society shares with the culturalist theory of capitalism. On the basis of this critique - otherwise known as the Marxian theory of value - Marx demonstrated the possibility and necessity of overcoming the *dualisms* that overrun all the main versions of modem bourgeois thought.

These considerations form the basis for assessing the 'first' crisis of modernity occasioned by the bifurcation of the inter-class bloc that spearheaded the bourgeois-democratic revolution - a crisis registered most fully by the culturalist theorists of capitalist society in company with such philosophers as Nietzsche and Heidegger, but also to some degree by the theorists of industrial society and the bourgeois optimists of neoclassical marginalism. This first crisis of modernist thought broke over what was to be a recurring theme of social-scientific and philosophical controversy in the twentieth century: the relationship between (objective, unconscious, law-bound) structures and (human, conscious, free) subjective agency.

The lineaments of this crisis can perhaps be most conveniently understood in relation to the philosophical legacy of Kant, whose ontological and epistemological dualism was, as he foresaw, well ahead of its time. The century spanning the appearance of Kant's philosophy and the neo-Kantian revival of the late nineteenth century (which influenced both Durkheim and Weber) saw a drift in bourgeois social thought from the certainty that capitalism simultaneously represents 'what is' and 'what ought to be' toward a stance that was far more sensitive to the irremediably irrational and indeterminate elements of the structure-agency relationship. In particular, the disaffection

of the working class from its erstwhile bourgeois ally in the democratic struggle, the former's increased capacity for collective organization and action, and the emergence of a proletarian-socialist politics all found an intimately interrelated reaction in the evolution of-bourgeois thought as a whole. The robust, vigorously anti-idealist scientism of the Enlightenment and of the heroic period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution gave way to a pervasive philosophical dualism that was more or less concealed by a mutual pact of non-interference between new currents of subjective idealism and an array of tepid neopositivisms. In the realm of economic theory, these developments were paralleled by the final dissolution of classical political economy and the rise of marginalism.

The common ideological motif of the early social and historical sciences of the bourgeois era - the conviction that capitalist social relations of production had a 'natural' foundation such that any challenge to them could only be construed as an irrational defiance of natural law - was to undergo a modification but not a substantive transformation with the development of a working-class/socialist reaction against it. However, it is important to appreciate the impetus to and character of this modification. On the one hand, classical political economy as a theory of *social structure* was decisively crippled by the crisis of its own 'supply-side' accounts of price formation (a crisis engendered by the inconsistencies of Ricardo's theory, the challenge of Marxism, and the inadequacies of Mill's cost-of-production theory of price). By effectively surrendering the terrain of a social-structural account of economic value to Marxism, classical political economy wrote its own death warrant. On the other hand, the ideological underpinnings of classical political economy's utopian belief in a harmony of interests within the capitalist class structure also came unhinged with the movement of the working class toward independent forms of political and industrial action (trade-union and socialist political organization). These two developments complemented and reinforced one another significantly: the resumption of class conflict called into question the efficacy of the market as the self-sufficient 'regulator' of social equilibrium, while the deficiencies of the social-structural theory of price seemed to find reflection in the inability of political economy to account for the 'irrational' *(collective* as well as anticapitalist) actions of the working class. In both instances, the rift between theory and reality - and between value and fact - could only further entrench a dualistic world-view already nurtured by a deepening division of mental and manual labour and by the proliferation of commodity production and exchange.

The upshot then is that the movement from classical political economy to marginalism involved a shift toward an increasingly *dualistic gnoseology.*

Classical political economy had sought to subsume the theory of action under its theory of the social structure, while laying claim to a monopoloy of competence in the interrogation of the social. Marginalist economics constitutively regarded the social order as intrinsically *divided,* its economic component constituted as the result of a multitude of (market-based) individual actions undertaken for the purpose ofallocating scarce resources to altemative uses, its cultural component constituted as the result of an ensemble of practices not directly influenced by the rationality of the process of economic exchange. By accepting this duality of the social structure, marginalism *completed* the 'naturalization' of capitalist relations of production, as well as of 'economic value,' while delimiting the theoretical boundaries of economics and creating a niche for other social sciences to pursue the analysis of the sociocultural dimensions of the social structure. The indeterminate relationship between the socio-economic and sociocultural components of the social structure - expressed in the theoretical dichotomization of 'economy' and 'society' that marginalism sanctioned by 'abstracting economic relations from all social content' (Clarke 1982: 234) - served as starting-point for a whole series of antinomies and binomial oppositions that came to characterize the crisis in bourgeois 'modernist' thought.

Marginalism and classical sociology subscribed to a common dualism that sanctioned the division of social reality into 'economy' and 'society,' while carving out distinctive areas of specialization within an increasingly ideologized division of intellectual labour. But this shared dualism found a *uniform* expression neither *within* nor *between* the two disciplines. Thus, the tendency of economists to regard sociology as concerned with the province of the 'irrational' was strongly challenged by Max Weber (1978), who saw the historical process of rationalization as one occurring in such non-economic domains as religion and law as well as in the (market) economy. Indeed, for Weber, the emergence of the modem rational form of capitalism depended on a larger historical process of rationalization, the progress of which he traced in the evolution of religious theodicies.

Nevertheless, the 'rational value-orientation' of capitalist society was deemed to be its defining characteristic by marginalist economics and Weberian sociology alike, and the task of sociology, from both perspectives, was chiefly to 'restore some degree of historical variety to the naturalism of economics' (Clarke 1982: 236), while also distinguishing between the rational and non-rational elements impinging on social action and the relationship between the economic and the sociocultural. *Both* marginalism and Weberian social theory regarded the capitalist socio-economic order as a confluence of *natural law* and *human volition based on 'ideas,'* with no

specifically 'social' intermediation between the two. Their 'differences,' such as they were, stemmed entirely from their different locations within a theoretical division of labour shaped by this common (dualistic) problematic.

The contrast between Weber's 'interpretive' sociology, with its focus on the subjective orientation to action and its attention to questions of culture, power, and conflict, and functionalist sociology, with its more Durkheimian focus on 'order' and the consensual and ritualistic bases of social reproduction, was to become an exemplar, *within* sociology itself, of an increasingly obvious disjunction between social theories stressing, respectively, a 'voluntarism' at the level of human action and an objectivist 'naturalism' at the level of the social structure. As Clarke emphasizes, *both* approaches involve highly questionable procedures of abstraction from the social relations of capitalist production - the voluntarist approach abstracting 'the individual' from these relations, while the naturalistic (neopositivist) approach abstracts nature itself. The two approaches may seem 'mutually exclusive' - but they are no less complementary for that fact. Indeed, within the framework of a common dualism, they maintain a symbiotic relationship, drawing strength from each other's deficiencies while tacitly acknowledging each other's 'achievements' as well. Their common refusal to consider the mediating role of Marx's 'social relations of production' - and hence also his law of value - closes the door to any escape from the dualistic problematic. The upshot, avers Clarke, is that 'modem sociology is condemned to exist within a world defined by a series of abstract dualisms which reflect the inadequacy of its foundations but which nevertheless structure sociological debate: structure-action; object-subject; positivism-humanism; holism-individualism;society-individual; explanation-understanding; order-conflict; authority-consent' (1982: 238-g). As it happens, this is an apt resume not only of the crisis of 'modem sociology' but of modem bourgeois thought in general.

While recognition of the *social form* of capitalist production is a necessary and indispensable basis for the repudiation of the 'naturalization' of capitalist relations of production, together with the dualistic problematic that that conception entails, the history of Marxist thought demonstrates both that it is a hard-won recognition and that it is an insufficient basis for avoiding dualism. The crisis in bourgeois modernism has clearly been paralleled in recent years by a 'crisis of Marxism' that appears to have many filiations and points of contact with the schism between 'scientific' and 'life-philosophical' orientations that characterizes the malaise of bourgeois modernity. But the question is, Does this crisis result from Marxism's theoretical focus on the 'social relations of production' (including, of course, *value relations),* or does it arise instead from a rather harsh encounter between theoretical expectation and

historical experience, between theory and practice? On the answer to this question hinges much in contemporary disputes between Marxists anda new levy of Marx-critics ('Analytical Marxists,' post-Marxists, postmodemists, poststructuralists, and so forth) who often affect opposition to capitalist modernity as well.

Like the bourgeois social theory of an earlier period, Marxism has been obliged to confront a major historical disappointment that has called into question many of its certitudes and engendered a very real crisis consciousness. The *bureaucratization of the workers' movement* (first in the trade unions and subsequently in the Social-Democratic and Communist parties) *and of the first workers' state* (the Soviet Union) has weighed no Jess heavily on the consciousness of Marxists, Western Marxists in particular, than did the persistence of class conflict on the intellectual heirs of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It is therefore hardly surprising that a certain convergence has occurred between Western Marxism and bourgeois social theory with respect to a number of dualist tropes, and that this convergence has often blurred the dividing line between 'Marxist' and 'non-Marxist' approaches.

The limits to this 'convergence' should nevertheless be evident. For what must appear as *eternal* antinomies in bourgeois philosophy and social theory must appear as historicaUy conditioned oppositions within Marxism. Moreover, such may be said even of Western Marxism's own tendency to divide into 'humanist' and 'scientific' camps.

On what basis, then, can it be maintained that the antinomies of the dualistic outlook area 'necessary' feature of bourgeois thought but are fundamentally, even 'constitutively,' alien to Marxism? To answer this question we must consider the deeper roots of the dualist world-view. The fundamental source of the dualist outlook is the division of mental and manual labour as reinforced and ramified by the separation of exchange and use inherent in commodity relations. Bourgeois thought is defined negatively by its complete inability to conceive of a social order in which either of these phenomena are transcended. The dualistic 'collapse' of bourgeois thought therefore reunites it with the social conditions of its dominance: the division of the direct producers and their exploiters; the opposition between production for use and production for profit; the separation of head and hand, and the extension of this separation for the first time into the very heart of the labour process. The theoretical posture of justifying such conditions could only serve to revive and then 'unravel' the metaphysical system most responsible for problematizing the relationship between determinism and freedom, facts and values, reason and sense experience within modem thought - the Kantian system. In those disciplines most attuned to the subject-object relation, Kant's dualism

was able to sanction a rivalry between two apparently 'opposite' approaches, which nevertheless complement one another and finda common ground in resisting all attempts at their mutual transcendence. At the theoretical level, Marxism stands as the most audacious of all such -attempt-s the materialist heir to the last significant idealist attempt at such a transcendence, the Hegelian system.

Yet it is above all at the level of *program* that Marxism resists the dualist outlook. Marx's programmatic vision of a classless, rationally planned, and democratically administered social order in which the contradiction between mental and manual labour would be progresssively overcome isa vision that finds translation at the level of theory in a repudiation of the notion that the dualities *specific to capitalism and class society* are ontologically rooted in the existence of 'two worlds' (subject-object, spirit-matter, noumena-phenomena, Milssen-Sollen, and so on). Hence, within the 'integrated' Marxist project, as within bourgeois thought, the relationship between theory and program isa dialectically interactive one, and program tends to generate theory.

But the reverse is, of course, also true; theory also generates (or influences) program, especially when the efficacy of that program seems most in doubt. The 'crisis of Marxism' is, in fact, pre-eminently an expression of the fact that Marxist intellectuals have developed grave doubts about the program that guided Marx in the elaboration of his theoretical perspectives. These doubts arise most generally from the *results* of the bureaucratization phenomenon mentioned earlier: the failure of the working class to realize its revolutionary potential under conditions of advanced capitalism, and its apparently related failure to maintain or assert control over the levers of state power in any of the countries where a transition to socialism has been ostensibly attempted. The question is thus posed: Does Marxist *theory* have the conceptual resources to explain these 'historical disappointments' ina way that remains consistent with its traditional *program?*

The harsh historical experience of 'labour bureaucracy' has not only been a 'test' of the viability and legitimacy of the Marxist program; it has also had serious implications for the *interpretation* of Marxism. The bureaucratic degeneration of both the classical Social Democracy and of the Soviet workers' state created highly favourable conditions for a 'monism' that decisively privileged objective structures over conscious human agency (much as classical political economy had done) and for the promulgation ofa rigidly deterministic Marxism purged of 'voluntaristic,' 'ethical,' 'humanist,' or 'subjectivist' elements. The theoretical reflex against such bureaucratic 'official' versions of Marxism was, not surprisingly, to capsize this decidely

undialectical monism in favour of a dualism involving a one-sided reassertion of the 'subject.' Thus was born the confrontation between the Two Marxisms - the inaugural moment of the 'crisis of Marxism.' Had the schizoid condition of modernity itself spelled the undoing of Marxism' s own project of enlightenment, progress, and ... (post-capitalist) modernity?

Analytical Marxism, Poststructuralism, and Rationality

It is common nowadays for Marxism - that is, Marx' s own Marxism - to be faulted for its conception of rationality. Indeed, the Achilles' heel of all forms of modernist thought is often said to be a too-confident and potentially sinister faith in Human Reason. Commenting on an early 'neo-Marxist' expression of this theme in Horkheimer and Adamo's *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* Leszek Kolakowski writes: 'The "dialectic" consisted in the fact that the [Enlightenment] movement which aimed to conquer nature and emancipate reason from the shackles of mythology had, by its own inner logic, turned into its opposite. It had created a positivist, pragmatist, utilitarian ideology and, by reducing the world to its purely quantitative aspects, had annihilated meaning, barbarized the arts and sciences, and increasingly subjected mankind to "commodity fetishism" '(1978: 373). For Horkheimer and Adorno the single-minded pursuit of knowledge that would enable human domination of nature is an expression of 'suJ:>jective reason' and leads to the eclipse of that 'objective reason' which alone permits the valorization of such *ends* of human action as freedom and democracy. Subjective reason dissolves the unity of means and ends by denying that human *goals* can be determined on the basis of reason; and reason is thereby reduced to finding means to ends that may be motivated by simple 'economic self-interest' - or even those barbarous human tendencies that find a concentrated distillation in fascism.

The key problem with this argument from a Marxist standpoint is that it fails to give due weight to the role of capitalist social relations of production in the devolution of the bourgeois Enlightenment into subjective reason. The values of justice, equality, progress, brotherhood, freedom, democracy, liberty, and universality had a muscular presence in the Enlightenment - the French Enlightenment in particular- and were integral to the Reason that the bourgeois-democratic revolution championed against the superstition, religiosity, mythologies, status inequalities, absolutism, and overt injustices of the feudal order. But they were not values that could be consistently pursued by a New Society founded on capitalist social relations and increasingly committed to the rational adaptation of means to the inherently *non-universal* end of private capital accumulation. As the claims of these values were

sublated by war, nationalism, colonial pillage, the oppressive realties of the industrial revolution, the resumption of class conflict, and the remorseless imperatives of the competitive pursuit of profit, the 'ethic' of the Enlightenment was passed on to, and necessarily transmutecj by, the socialist heirs of the bourgeois-democratic revolution: the Jacobin-communists, the utopian socialists, the Red 48ers, the Social-Democrats, the Communards, and the Marxists. For Marx, the abandonment of Enlightenment values in favour of a narrowly defined 'subjective reason' was not at all the result of the Enlightenment's drive to 'dominate nature,' but was rather the consequence of the adaptation of 'reason' to the imperatives of capital. To reclaim the original unity of means and ends promised by Enlightenment reason required not just a critique of the technical-instrumental rationality that capital had exalted, but the negation of the capitalist social relations of production and the law of value promised by the immanent *anti-systemic* (that is, anticapitalist) rationality of the workers' movement toward socialism.

The concept of rationality posited by Marx is integral to his critical scientific project of disclosing the historical movement of capitalist society. But it has been challenged, implicitly and explicitly, from two different directions in recent years, at least partly in response to the perceived 'crisis of Marxism.' Poststructuralists, for their part, challenge Marxism's claim to 'objective knowledge' of capitalist society based on dialectical reason. On the other hand, 'Analytical Marxists,' particularly 'rational-choicetheorists,' challenge Marx's findings on the grounds that they fail to conform to the principles of methodological individualism (Roemer 1988, Elster 1982) and subjective rationality. In this, of course, they reprise an old complaint of the marginalists concerning the rational foundations of Marx's law of value - a good place to begin.

Rationality and Irrationality in the Law of Labour-Value

The 'Analytical' or 'Rational-choice' school of neo-Marxism has been justifiably dubbed 'neoclassical Marxism' by its critics for having fully embraced the methodological principles of neoclassical economics in its efforts to (a) 'refute' Marx's theory of labour-value and his general analysis of capitalism's laws of motion, and (b) sustain the proposition that exploitation occurs under capitalism through mechanisms different from those specified by Marx.

The most influential theorist of 'rational-choice' Marxist economics is John Roemer, whose 'general theory of exploitation' is meant to be equally valid for all societies founded upon class inequality and differential access

to productive resources. Roemer's criticisms of Marx's theory of value are unremarkable; they are the traditional ones of neoclassical economics, supplemented by certain neo-Ricardian observations. What is new in Roemer's work is his attempt to generate the phenomenon of exploitation as a theoretical result of neoclassical concepts.

Roemer asserts that his theoretical model explains 'some phenomena, in deriving them from logically prior data ... [The] data are: differential ownerships of the means of production, preferences and technology. Everything is driven by these data; class and exploitation are explained to be a consequence of initial property relations' (quoted in Lebowitz 1988). It would seem, as Lebowitz points out, that Roemer, 'like Marx,' starts from 'logically prior data' that 'are not the subject of his analysis (i.e. "unsubstantiated postulates")' (1988: 203). But whereas Marx's 'unsubstantiated postulates' are taken from 'history, from real life, the real concrete,' Roemer's are borrowed from the conceptual instrumentarium of neoclassical economics. Here we arrive at the real heart of the problem with Roemer's model: its inability to specify either the real conditions or the developmental tendencies of the capitalist mode of production. Capitalist *property* relations rather than capitalist social relations of production are both the starting-point and terminus of Roemer's analysis. But the specification of these property relations - the unequal distribution of property in the means of production - is insufficent to generate any conclusions beyond the banality that capitalism involves exploitation. Roemer's theory tells us little about the capitalist imperative to control the labour process, to reproduce the capitaVwage-labour relation, and to subordinate the process of production to the goal of profit-making. And it tells us even less about the 'crisis tendencies' bred by the *contradictory* character of capitalist social relations of production.

The result of Roemer's approach is to problematize the relationship between a (neo-Marxian) theory of exploitation and the (ethical) imperative to achieve a society without exploitation. Nothing in Roemer's theory suggests an immanent tendency within capitalism to negate itself or to call forth the conclusion that capitalism not only 'ought' to be replaced by socialism but 'must' be so replaced. This lacuna in Roemer's 'Marxist economic philosophy' is the necessary result of his failure to break with the nai."ve naturalism, formalism, and one-sidedly subjective concept of rationality characteristic of marginalism. In responding to the rational-choice Marxists, then, we need to recapitulate some basic differences between Marx and the marginalists.

The marginalist concept of value, it bears repeating, is a naturalistic one. Value is conceived to be a *natural* phenomenon stemming from the unmed-

iated relation of individual economic actors to 'things,' and therefore is considered an effectively 'eternal' aspect of human existence. The 'rationality' of this relation is by no means unconditional, for while it is promoted by the natural laws of the market-place, it is COJ!lpromised by human irrationality stemming from 'non-economic' interests. We might say, following Fischer's (198 2) terminology, that the marginalist concept of economic value is a typically 'two-tiered' theory involving *natural structures* (for example, the price structure) and *individual subjects* (who are 'free' to either abide by or defy the 'natural' imperatives of the market economy).

By contrast, the Marxist concept of value involves a 'three-tiered' theoretical approach. Between 'natural laws' and idea-oriented 'human agency' stand the social relations of production that mediate the natural and the ideal components of the social order. Value is conceived not as a natural phenomenon but as a determinate socio-historical form of the human imperative to articulate a division of labour, a relation between people.

The supreme importance of *subjective* rationality to modem social theory is well stated by Swedberg, Himmelstrand, and Brulin: 'The notion of rationality, if handled correctly, might provide a solution to the old problem in sociology of simultaneously accounting for the autonomy of the actor and the influence of the social surroundings on his or her actions. The concept of rationality safeguards the notion of the actor's autonomy through its stress on the importance of choice. If this choice plus its parameters could be properly accounted for in sociological terms, the ship so-to-speak would be in harbor' (1987: 183).

It is precisely in connection with the notion of the 'parameters' of rational action that the decisive difference between the two-tiered conception of economic value enunciated by marginalism and the three-tiered conception of Marxist value theory can be most clearly elucidated. Somewhat schematically it may be said that marginalism is predicated upon the notion that the capitalist economy is inherently rational in the sense that it operates in accordance with 'predictable natural laws' and encourages behaviour on the part of economic agents that conforms to them. Specifically, economic agents are encouraged to pursue the rational goal of maximizing their utilities by selecting means that are in harmony with the natural laws of the market-place. To the extent that such rationality can be imputed to the individual economic actor, the problem of the structure-agency relation, within 'the economy' at least, becomes soluble.

Marx's theory of value leads to very different conclusions about the 'rationality' of the capitalist mode of production. Economic rationality is defined not in terms of 'predictability,' but in far more 'substantive' terms: the degree

to which the relations of production can systematically promote the productivity of labour and the progress of human culture. On this criterion of rationality, the capitalist mode of production must be regarded as a unity of contradictory elements - a unity that plays a substantively rational role in human development only up to the point at which the relations of production begin systematically to *restrain* the development of human capacities.

This insight leads directly to a contrast of the notions of individual (subjective) rationality and systemic (objective) rationality. The marginalist criterion of rationality is an *entirely* individualistic one: how well has the individual actor adapted the 'naturally available' means to a desired and 'naturally possible' end? By contrast, the three-tiered approach of Marxism permits *two* quite distinct criteria of rationality: the rationality of the social actor inserted within particular social relations of production, and the systemic rationality of the social structure (mode of production) itself. The contrast between the rationality of the individual capitalist and the rationality of agencies seeking to safeguard the interests of the *social capital as a whole* (political parties, the capitalist state, and so on) illustrates how the value-theoretical analysis of capitalism involves an appreciation of the ways in which 'rationality' and 'irrationality' operate at both the individual and collective (or systemic) levels.

Consider the following example. It is eminently 'rational' for individual capitalists to reduce their costs of production and enhance their competitive position by replacing living workers with machines. But such action may also end in a rise in the organic composition of the social capital as a whole, producing a decline in the average rate of profit- a substantively 'irrational' result unanticipated and undesired by the innovating capitalists. By introducing labour-saving technology, the individual capitalist may *believe* that she or he is selecting means that are rationally suited to the goal of a higher profit rate - and this may even be the case up to a point. But we know that a higher profit rate is not *only* a function of the 'natural' conditions of production, but pre-eminently of what is transpiring within the social structure of 'abstract labour' as a whole. Thus, the temporary advantage that a capitalist might gain by introducing labour-saving technology (an advantage reflected in a higher-than-average transitional rate of profit, signifying the capitalist's superior ability to meet the 'natural' challenges of production) is bound to disappear as competing capitals close the technological gap and with it the discrepancy between the OCC of the original innovator and the OCC of the social capital. Moreover, once this (temporary) advantage disappears, so too will the higher-than-average profit rate. A falling profit rate will ensue resulting from insufficient surplus-value production in relation to capital investment. Thus, what

appears as a subjectively rational move on the part of an individual capitalist seeking to employ superior knowledge of natural laws (technology) in pursuit of higher profits may end in lower profits.

In the three-tiered theoretical conception of :rytarxist value theory, then, individual rationality must be adjudged in relation to systemic rationality as well as in relation to natural laws and contingencies.Marginalism, by contrast, considers that the rationality of individual actions can be judged in relation to a set of conditions in which it is assumed a priori that no contradiction can exist between 'the natural' and 'the social.'

This point has direct relevance to the way in which the Roemerian theory of exploitation, the 'game theory' of Jon Elster (1982) and Erik Olin Wright (198 5), and the general methodological individualism of the rational-choice school of Analytical Marxism serve to sever the link between the substantive macro-rationality/irrationality of the social structure and the micro-rationality/irrationality of purposive agents inserted within that structure. First, the social results of human agency are seen to be & mere aggregation of individual actions, unaffected and unmediated by the collective expressions of the social relations of production (the distribution of social labour, the structure of abstract labour, class formation, the state, and so on). Second, the rationality of individual social actors is seen to be entirely a function of their subjectively perceived interests within the framework of the existing social structure. Finally, the possibility is never considered that the consciousness of individual actors may be affected through the reflexive monitoring of the *objective substantive irrationality* of capitalism as a system. Yet it is just this possibility that allows (even relatively privileged) members of the 'middle classes' to (rationally) take their stand with the working class in the struggle for an alternative social order, socialism.

Marxism rejects a one-sided concern with subjective rationality, understanding that the consciousness of individual agents is always the complex result of elements of rationality and irrationality operating at macro and micro levels, and through objective structures as well as subjective agents. Yet Marxism, too, has often viewed the structure-agency relation as relatively unproblematic to the extent that rationality can be imputed to 'the collective subject': that is, to the extent that a revolutionary class consciousness can be imputed to the working class. It has frequently been assumed by Marxists that the increasing 'systemic irrationality' of capitalism would bring in its wake an increasing 'rationality' on the part of the putative revolutionary subject. However, this is frequently not the case. While Marxism possesses theoretical resources that help to explain why working-class people have difficulty in achieving and retaining this rationality of revolutionary consciousness, the problem remains that the theory of ideology and the theory of capitalism's structural contradictions require articulation with one another.

It is precisely this articulation that the theory of value facilitates. On the one hand, Marx's value theory is the basis for disclosing the link between the real subsumption oflabour by capital and the phenomenon of 'commodity fetishism.' On the other hand, the theory of value provides the basis for an understanding of the process of 'cognitive appropriation' and the dissemination of a dualistic consciousness. The law of value, then, occupies the terrain of *both* structure and subject, providing conceptual resources to explain significant elements of both the 'objective' structural articulation of social labour *and* the social determination of particular modes of consciousness and cognition. Marx's 'value,' in brief, shows that 'objective structures' and 'subjective agency' belong to *the same world.*

Marx's concept of value is inseparable from his analytic focus on the social relations of production as the mediating link between 'natural laws' and 'human agency' under capitalism. The limits of this focus also suggest the limits of a value-theoretical perspective in the analysis of capitalism and of human agency within capitalist societies. It should go without saying that Marxist value theory neither provides, nor seeks to provide, a *full* account of either 'natural laws' or of human agency (influenced as it is by a plethora of factors irreducible to the prevailing relations of production). Accordingly, this theory should not be seen as a 'master-key' to the structure-agency relationship even as this manifests itself under capitalism. Precisely because no such master-key exists, neither structure nor subject should be accorded a *privileged* theoretical position. Nevertheless, Marx clearly and, I think, reasonably, intended that the theory of value should be seen as an objective theoretical *guide to action,* as a source of insight into the historical limits of the capitalist structure and into the conditions and possibilities of its transcendence.

The historical-materialist and value-theoretic focus on the social relations of production permits theoretical inquiry to go beyond the dualist preoccupations that have led so many non-Marxist theorists into an attenuation or even an outright rejection of the concept of objective truth (Anderson 1982). It is precisely this attenuation/rejection that provides a thematic unity to the two main strands within 'poststructuralist' thought: the 'sociological' poststructuralism of Michel Foucault, with its emphasis on the role of 'power relations' in constituting knowledge (Foucault 1972), and the 'textual' poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida, with its emphasis on the self-referential nature of the 'system of signs' and its insistence that 'there is nothing outside the text' (Derrida 1976: 158). Both of these schools of thought represent a

development of 'structuralist' thought in a direction that involves the 'decentring' of structures without a reassertion of the role of the 'subject.' As Anderson pithily suggests, poststructualism thereby licenses a 'subjectivism without a subject' (1982: 54).

Both versions of poststructuralism have been subjected to incisive and devastating criticism in recent years (Anderson 198 2, Dews 1987, Callinicos 1990, Palmer 1990, MacDonald 1990), and I shall not recapitulate those criticisms here. But it should be pointed out that the poststructuralist 'challenge' to the dialectical reason of Marxism stems mainly from a species of 'cynical reason' (Sloterdijk 1988), rather than from the sort of one-sided 'subjective reason' associated with marginalism and rational-choice Marxism. This 'cynical reason' is associated with the invocation of Nietzsche's 'will-to-power' theme, particularly in the case of Foucault, together with a reassertion of the universal applicability of Ferdinand de Saussaure's model of structural linguistics to the interrogation of knowledge claims.

Both Foucauldian and Derridean poststructuralism seek to construct barriers against 'totalizing' tendencies in philosophy and social theory (of which Marxism is supposedly particularly guilty on some accounts). Yet, by positing 'power' as the master-category for the explication of the genealogy of modernity, and/or by privileging 'language' over practice in the constitution of the social, poststructuralists seem to fall victim to precisely those totalizing tendencies that they claim to deplore. Evidently, poststructuralist totalizations are to be preferred because they discourage notions of 'total social transformation' - but this simply assumes what needs to be demonstrated: that a total social transformation at the level of the social relations of production is neither needed nor desirable.

Significantly, the 'language model' that intruded so successfully into social theory on the wave of structuralism and poststructuralism is itself vulnerable to a historical-materialist critique to the extent that its provenance is a *dualist* one. Saussure's 'signifier' and 'signified' may be seen without too much difficulty as the binomial poles of a veritable archetype of the disjunction of an ontological unity, the 'sign.' In this regard, several attempts have been made by Marxist theorists to disclose a link between post-Saussurean semiotics and the social ontology of commodity relations (Timpanaro 1980, Lipietz 1985). Not surprisingly, even Derrida's poststructuralist strategy of 'deconstruction' - for all its self-conscious opposition to 'metaphysics' and its internalist critique of Saussurean semiotics - fails to really break from this dualistic tradition. As MacDonald incisively points out: 'The theory of deconstruction reveals how the lesser term of the dualism is repressed within the system; it brings the form of that repression to light. But no value belongs to

that term. What deconstruction demonstrates is the necessity of both terms, and the inevitability of the privileging of the dominant term in all language and representation. It is clear from this that the hierarchy of philosophical dualisms stays undisturbed despite deconstruction's revelation of the internal interdependency of its terms' (1990: 23 7).

None of this should be construed as suggesting that the analysis of language, communication, or power/domination is 'alien' to historical materialism. The issue is not whether these shibboleths of poststructuralism should be explored, but whether they should be explored *in connection with* an analysis of the social relations of production and the determinate socio-historical forms of human labour, or whether they should be accorded a kind of ontological *privilege*, such that they become a rationale for *ignoring* the issue of the social relations of production. Again, it is quite apparent that the tendency of bourgeois thought is to accord a theoretical privilege to anything that sublates the issue of the social relations of production. To this extent, poststructuralism serves a highly useful purpose from the bourgeois standpoint as a major intellectual *diversion* from the theoretical and programmatic results of Marx's devastating critique of capitalist social relations.

Postmodernism: Condition or Fashion?

It is hardly accidental that most theorizations of the 'postmodern condition' are so heavily dependent on poststructuralist and Baudrillardian perspectives that sublate the analysis of the social relations of production while seeking to overcome the familiar duality of culture and industry by focusing precisely on that fearsome 'postmodern' complex: the culture industry. Postmodernists assured us throughout most of the 1980s that the 'new reality' was one in which the production of knowledge, fashions, simulacra, tastes, and even identities would count for far more than the production of Marx's 'value' and the crises this bred; and they added that it was only upon this essentially cultural terrain that conflicting visions of the future could be fought out. Yet the putative omnipotence of the established culture industry was such as to really deny the possibility of such contests resulting in 'the conscious construction of alternative social futures' (Harvey 1989: 34). For postmodern culture had supposedly fragmented the 'alienated subject' of Marx's social theory into a plethora of subjects incapable of pursuing the Enlightenment project 'with a tenacity and coherence sufficient to bring us some better future' (ibid.). This vision was nicely summarized by Terry Eagleton:

Post-modernism signals the death of ... 'metanarratives' whose secretly terroristic

function was to ground and legitimate the illusion of a 'universal' human history. We are now in the process of wakening from the nightmare of modernity, with its manipulative reason and fetish of the totality, into the laid-back pluralism of the post-modern, that heterogeneous range of lifestyles and J nguage games which has renounced the nostalgic urge to totalize and legitimate itself ...Science and philosophy must jettison their grandiose metaphysical claims and view themselves more modestly as just another set of narratives. (Quoted in Harvey 1989: 9)

The characteristic themes of postmodernist ideology are ultimately explicable in terms of a sea-change that has not produced a capitalism immune from the contradictions and crisis tendencies identified by **Marx,** but which is itself the product of a maturing of these contradictions in a climate of politico-ideological reaction (1980s Reaganism, Thatcherism, Mitterrand's 'austerity socialism,' and so forth). The extreme measures associated with the real 'successes' of neoconservatism in the 1980s (from union-busting and military Keynesianism to the erosion of the welfare state and the victory over Soviet power) has destroyed the illusion of the inexorable progress of 'modem societies' through gradual and incremental reforms; and the association of this vision with various 'metanarratives' of historical progress (including, quite mistakenly, Marx's program of *social revolution)* has disoriented many (formerly) left-wing intellectuals now identified with the post-modernist trend. Wallowing in impressionism, postmodernist intellectuals have mistaken their own disorientation and that of the labour movement with a permanent fragmentation of that ensemble of forces which retains the objective capacity to transform society, but which now lacks the will and vision to doso.

Postmodemism certainly exists as a fashionable intellectual and cultural current; but can we speak of a 'postmodern condition' that is significantly different from the 'condition of modernity'? It seems doubtful. Clearly, the rise of postmodernist thought coincided with a significant conjunctural transition in the history of twentieth-century capitalism; but the 'restructuring' that we are now witnessing changes nothing essential about the laws of motion of capitalism. Rather this restructuring has been necessitated by the increasing dislocations and crisis tendencies bred by the laws of Jabour-value and capital accumulation. It is a perverse logic that now insists that the rather desperate and destabilizing changes occasioned by the malaise of capitalism constitute proof of a postmodern renaissance of this moribund system; still more absurd is the competing postmodernist thesis of capitalism's transformation into 'post-capitalism' thanks to technologically driven social, economic, and cultural changes. What seems obvious to those not blinded by the glitter of the

postmodernist cultural spectacle is that the most significant changes of recent years have their roots in a severe crisis of capitalist socio-economic relations (the 'economy'). Writing in the late 1980s, David Harvey observed that 'it is conventional these days ... to dismiss out of hand any suggestion that the "economy" (however that vague word is understood) might be determinant of cultural life even in (as Engels and later Althusser suggested) "the last instance". The odd thing about postmodern cultural production is how much sheer profit-seeking is determinant in the first instance' (1989: 336). Only three years later, the watchword of the American presidential elections was to become 'It's the economy stupid!', and hypocritical postmodern indifference to the course of economic events lost much of its ill-deserved fashionability. The severe and persistent recession that gripped most of the advanced capitalist world in the early 1ggos confirmed that the brave new world of capitalist (or 'post-capitalist') 'post- modernity' was looking more and more like the deeply troubled capitalism of early twentieth-century 'modernity.' New times, certainly. A new 'stage' of capitalism's world-historical crisi-s perhaps. A postmodern 'transcendence' of capitalism - hardly.

Bureaucracy, the Law ofVaJue, and the Crisis of Capitalist Modernity

At the ideological and political levels. contemporary capitalism is weathering the current crisis remarkably well. Intellectuals remain preoccupied with ideas that pose no fundamental challenge to the existing order, while the labour movement is paralysed by its leadership's refusal to question the rules of the capitalist game. We are currently experiencing the worst conjunctural crisis of the world capitalist economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s; but instead of working people waging a vigorous defence of their living standards and rallying to a socialist project of scrapping capitalism, we are witnessing the persistent appeal of 'cyncical reason' and of irrationalist finger-pointing. With remarkable success, the capitalists and their agents have been able to convince most that the current crisis is an inevitable product of 'globalization,' 'restructuring,' 'living beyond our means,' 'the deficit,' 'restricted trade,' 'the welfare state,' 'bad government policies of the past,' 'too many immigrants,' 'women in the workforce,' and so on - anything, that is to say, but the irrationalities and contradictions of capitalist production. This state of affairs, transient as it may be, continues to generatea hospitable climate for postmodernist ideology, precisely because the latter, like all conservative ideologies, rests on 'the idea that *prejudice* is so deeply built into our traditions of thought that no amount of rational criticism can hope to dislodge it' (Christopher Norris, quoted in Callinicos 1990: 94). But the

present disorientation of intellectuals, leftists, trade unionists, and would-be progressives has a more immediate point of origin than any alleged popular preference for prejudice over reason. There is a very good reason why many people are loath to identify the source of our current difficulties in capitalism; for to do so is to immediately invite the argument that there is no good alternative, and that we must therefore muddle through as best we can, all the while respecting the parameters, the logic, and the integrity of the capitalist order.

It is a compelling argument, made all the stronger by the failure of many Marxists and socialists to understand the real significance of the sorry experience of Stalinism in the former Soviet bloc as well as the ignominious record of Western labour reformism in recent years. The problem of 'labour bureaucracy' has indeed brought the mainstream of the international labour and socialist movements up against a seemingly insurmountable brick wall. In this context, the association of Marx's 'economics' with the fatalism and objectivism that characterized the *failed* projects of reformist socialism and Stalinism can only encourage a reappraisal of the former that subverts an understanding of the *unified* theoretical and political project that was Marx's chief legacy. For if, as I have argued previously, Marx's own criterion for truth is finally a practical one, the collapse of Stalinist 'real socialism' in the Soviet bloc cannot fail to influence perceptions of the veracity of Marx's theory of value, his critique of capitalism, and his program of human emancipation. The crisis of bureaucratic rule in the Stalinist states has clearly found partial but unmistakable expression as a crisis of 'actually existing planned economy.' The lesson being drawn here - concerning the alleged indispensability of 'free market' mechanisms to the optimization of economic efficiency - would seem to decisively vitiate Marx's programmatic goal: the realization of a society in which the relations of 'people to people' are no longer dominated by 'objective bonds' and in which 'universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal relations, are ... subordinated to their own communal control' can fulfil the promise of a non-alienated 'individuality' marked by 'universality and the comprehensiveness of ... relations and capacities' (Marx 1973: 162). In short, if the Soviet experience of 'building socialism' is any indication, Marx's project of socialist disalienation appears to be in serious trouble as a guide to changing reality - and with it the value theory upon which it is at least partially predicated.

This general conclusion, however, assumes that the hegemonic forms of 'Marxist practice' in recent decades *have been* informed by Marx's theory of value, his critique of capitalist production, and his theory of alienation. But on this score there is considerable room for doubt. Indeed, there is really no

reason to believe that Marx would have endorsed the view that his theory of value enjoins the working class to conciliate the bourgeoisie with a program of reforms *within* the framework of capitalism, or the view that progress toward a rationally planned socialist economy can be made *without* the democratic involvement of the associated producers and consumers, and *without* the benefit of an international socialist division of labour. On the contrary, Marx's value theory points socialist practice precisely in the direction of a revolutionary confrontation with a capitalist order that *relies on* the operations of the law of value to divide, disorient, and blackmail the working class into playing by capital's 'rules of the game.' And just as decisively, Marx's value-theoretic critique of capitalist alienation suggests that the material and social bases for authentic socialism can only be laid through a commitment to internationalist (universalist) principles and an *extension* of individual human capacities - something that is impossible so long as society remains in the grip of a bureaucratic dictatorship.

This last consideration returns us to a key problem alluded to earlier: the capacity of Marxism to account theoretically for the persistence of the bureaucratic phenomenon in the labour and socialist movements, and to specify adequately the conditions under which it can be subdued. To do so Marxists are obliged to confront critically that 'modernist metanarrative' that has somehow escaped the 'counter-terrorist' excoriation of conservative postmodernism: Max Weber's account of the bureaucratic rationalization of the modern world. In doing so, they will be assisted by a considerable volume of Marxist and non-Marxist organizational theory and empirico-historical evidence that effectively refutes the Weberian thesis that 'no alternative' exists to 'rational-legal bureaucracy' within 'complex' organizations (see Clegg 1990 for a good survey, and Meszaros 1989 for a pitiless Marxist dissection of Weber's thesis). Weber's related sophistry that 'socialism' will remove the last remaining obstacle ('the market'!) to a complete 'bureaucratization of the world' must also be stripped of the ill-deserved credibility it has enjoyed owing to the damage done by Stalinism. The rise of Stalinist bureaucratism in the first country to attempt the 'construction of socialism' proves not the Weberian thesis of the inevitability of socialist bureaucracy ('the Russian Communists were obliged to adopt bureaucratic methods to promote efficiency') but rather the Marxist thesis that bureaucracy is fundamentally rooted in social antagonisms and that it is inimical to the development of a healthy and efficient socialism. It should, after all, be recalled that the consolidation of the Stalinist bureaucratic oligarchy occurred in the context of the market-oriented New Economic Policy of the early to mid-192os and not as a result of the institutionalization of central planning in the late

1920s (the *specific form* of which was determined above all by the anterior fact of bureaucratic dictatorship).

The most fundamental failing of Weber's theory of bureaucracy has been identified by Ernest Mandel:

> Max Weber assumes that bureaucratic rule is inherently rational. And that is not the case. Bureaucratic rule implies a combination of partial rationality and global irrationality, which exactly reflects the parallel combination in market economy and generalized commodity production - that is, capitalism itself - with whose historical rise the bureaucratic systems are closely bound up. It expresses the necessity of a more rationally functioning state to protect the interests of property-owners, one that will assure legal security, non-arbitrary use of monetary systems, safeguards against economic policies that hinder the flow of commodities, and so on. *But these increments in rationality, for each person, firm or state taken separately, lead to a historically increasing irrationality of the system (the world) in it totality.* And of that Weber is not aware. (1992: 182)

For Mandel, as for the classical tradition of revolutionary Marxism, the contradictions of advanced capitalism necessitate the scrapping of both the 'free market' and bureaucracy as the dominant (complementary) modes of social organization in favour of a system of socialist 'self-administration' - a system whose material and social prerequisites (a radical reduction in the work-week, a highly productive economy, a well-educated population) are being brought into being by capitalism itself.

Despite the recent asseverations of Vincent (1991) and Sayer (1991) that Marxists should pay greater heed to Weber, the Weberian 'metanarrative' of a modem world trapped by the inexorable logic of bureaucratic rationality cuts against an understanding of the historical limits of capitalism, bureaucracy, and the law of value. But such a recognition hardly absolves Marxists of the responsibility to outline the broad contours of an alternative social order or the need to adumbrate the organizational, programmatic, and strategic measures required to counter the very real and disabling problem of labour bureaucracy in the anticapitalist struggle. Partly this will be a labour of recovery - for much of value concerning these matters was said by an earlier generation of Marxists (Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky, Gramsci, Rakovsky, and others), only to be marginalized or forgotten amidst a storm of social-democratic and Stalinist obloquy and distortion. But Marxists must also shed their traditional reticence to 'construct in thought' an appealing vision of an alternative socialist society, not least because such a vision is more than ever necessary to motivating an authentically socialist human

agency. Only on this condition can the 'cynical reason' ofpostmodemism be overcome and confidence in human progress recaptured, for only then can we begin to anticipate an end to the abhorent rule of capital - and the Invisible Leviathan.

rate of profit from 1950 to 1981; but they do so by abstracting the manufacturing sector from the rest of the economy, a procedure that I regard as theoretically inadmissible. **Marx's** average rate of profit is calculable only with reference to the *social capital* as a whole.

17 The OCC defined as C/v + s4 has a trend line that rises from 3.48 in 194 7 to 5.97 in 1980 (r• = 0.93, p.<.0001). By contrast, the trend line for C/v + s5 rises only from 2.022 in 1947 to 2.203 in 1980 (r• = 0.38).

18 The trend line for the ratio s4'v rises from 0.546 in 194 7 to 0.81o in 1980 (r• = 0.56). For the ratio s5/v **it** rose from 1.632 in 1947 to 3.894 in 1980 (r• = o.97).

19 The trend line for s5/C *rises* from 0.3190 in 1947 to 0.3678 in 1980 (r• = 0.55). But the trend line for s4'C falls from 0.1 oo in 194 7 to 0.074 in 1980 (r• = 0.46). When s4'C was treated as the dependent variable and C/v + s4 as the independent variable, an r• of 0.69 was obtained, indicating that much of the downward trend in the rate of profit is accounted for by the upward trend in theOCC.

20 For data on productivity and the real wages of production workers, see Shaikh 1987: 118-22; and Smith 1984: 281-3.

Chapter 10

1 Ellen Meiksins Wood, in her important book *The Retreat from Class*, identifies Poulantzas as the 'forerunner' of a (non-class-struggle) 'new "true" socialism' that has been embraced by many erstwhile Marxists, among them Gorz (1982) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985). As Wood demonstrates well, Poulantzas's erroneous theoretical conceptions of class were very much in the service of a Maoist and then a Eurocommunist politics oriented toward subordinating the independent workers' movement to a class-collaborationist 'popular front' alliance. The influence of such Stalinist conceptions continues to infonn the theory and politics of many who now identify themselves with 'post-Marxist' socialism. For further critical perspectives on this trend, see Panitch (1986) and Geras (1990).

2 Not the least of these 'cultural' circumstances concerns the issue of whether the value of labour-power is nonnatively equated with an individual or a family wage. Marx suggests that the value of labour-power must take into account the wage labourer's obligation to support non-wage-earning family members (a spouse, dependent children, etc.). But this is not always the case, especially under conditions of increased labour-force participation by women (which may or may not be the result of a decline in the real wages of male workers and which may or may not promote such a decline). Related to this issue is the still-unresolved debate surrounding the contribution of unpaid domestic labour to the reproduction of the commodity labour-power and therewith ('indirectly') to the production of surplus-value in the 'public' economy. Some of the major contributions to these discussions include Gerstein 1973; Seccombe 1974; Fox 1980;

and Humphries 1977. See also Urse) 1992 for a historical analysis of how state intervention has affected the interrelationship between productive and 'reproductive' spheres in Canada.

3 In providing some elements of an answer to this question I will focus on narrowly defined 'programmatic' issues and leave the strategic and tactical issues of working-class organization and fonns of struggle to the side.

4 In saying this I am, of course, following Trotsky's judgment that the Soviet Union was a 'degenerated workers' state' from 1924 on. Central to Trotsky's analysis is the idea that the Stalinist bureaucracy was by no means a finished 'ruling class' but rather a 'parasitic oligarchy' that would either be removed by a working-class political revolution or pave the way for a return to capitalism. On this view, the Soviet 'transitional' society was not indicative of 'the general laws of modem society from capitalism to socialism ... but a special, exceptional and temporary refraction of those laws under the conditions of a backward revolutionary country in a capitalist environment' (Trotsky 1970a: 7). Accordingly, the lessons of the Soviet experience pertain mainly to 'the application of *socialist* methods to the solution of *pre-socialist* problems' (1970b: 57) under conditions of extreme *bureaucratic deformation* of these methods.